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Abstract
We investigate the question of whether sophistication in risk management
fosters banking stability. We compare a simple banking system in which an av-
erage rating is used with a sophisticated banking system in which banks are able
to assess the default risk of entrepreneurs individually. Both banking systems
compete for deposits, loans, and equity. While a sophisticated system rewards
entrepreneurs with low default risks by low loan interest rates, a simple system
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1 Introduction
The popular view of banking regulation is that more sophistication in rating and risk
management increases the stability of banking systems. This view has motivated the
introduction of modern risk management techniques during the last decade. While
such techniques which cause the transformation of risk are well established in capital
markets1, the application of sophisticated rating tools by commercial banks is a more
recent development. From the perspective of a single institution, it is clear that costless
sophistication of risk management techniques is always beneficial. However, whether
or not this holds for the economy as a whole is a largely unresolved issue.
In this paper we argue that a systemic perspective may lead to quite different conclu-
sions from those derived from the perspective of a single institution. We investigate the
issue of to what extent the investment behavior of banks and the stability of the bank-
ing system will change with the introduction of more sophistication in rating and risk
management. We explore the case when banks which compete for equity, loans, and
deposits may adjust their capital base and hence their balance sheets. This situation
corresponds to the long term. The short term when banks do not adjust their equity
is treated in Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2006). There it is shown that sophisticated
risk management is only beneficial if initial bank capital is sufficiently high.
We consider a competitive banking system in which banks offer their intermediation
services to a population of entrepreneurs who have three investment opportunities.
They may either invest their initial wealth into a production project which is subject
to macroeconomic risks, into equity of banks, or into an alternative investment project
with an exogenously given return. Banks compete for equity and deposits and offer
loans as delegated monitors. Risk premia on loans are determined by the equity market
as banks need to offer sufficient returns in order to attract equity. We compare two
polar cases, a simple and a sophisticated banking system. In the simple system banks
are unable to rate the risk of an investment project individually. They attribute the
same default probability to each borrower and thus use the same rating. In the so-
phisticated system banks use an infinitely fine rating system in which each borrower is
individually rated. Loan interest rates are tailored according to the default probability
of an entrepreneur.
Our main findings are as follows. First, relative to the simple banking system in which
1A large body of literature investigates the consequences of modern risk management techniques
for capital markets which have risen dramatically over the last decades, cf. Carey & Stulz (2006).
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all entrepreneurs are offered the same credit terms, a sophisticated system offers high-
quality entrepreneurs low interest rates and low-quality entrepreneurs high interest
rates. Second, loan demand in a simple banking system is higher than in a sophis-
ticated system because credit terms for low-quality entrepreneurs are more favorable.
This allows simple banks to attract more equity while in a sophisticated system more
resources are invested into the alternative project. Hence, concerns are justified that
sophisticated rating as imposed by the Basel II regulatory framework will make it diffi-
cult for middle-sized firms to obtain loans. Third, aggregate repayments in the simple
banking system are on average higher than in the sophisticated system in macroeco-
nomic environments with low productivity. As simple banks acquire more equity, their
capital buffer against adverse macroeconomic shocks is larger. Hence, although sophis-
ticated banks have higher average quality projects, the default risk of the sophisticated
system is generally higher.
The approach of this paper is complementary to the work of Gehrig & Stenbacka (2004)
who show that uncoordinated screening behavior of competing financial intermediaries
creates a financial multiplier and may be an independent source of fluctuations. In
analyzing the systemic effects of screening activities by firms, this paper contributes
to the literature on screening by banks surveyed, for example, in Freixas & Rochet
(1997). The focus of this paper is more on the consequences for market conditions and
systemic defaults when banks introduce more sophisticated rating tools. An interesting
question for future research is how even more sophisticated risk management techniques
such as the securitization of bank loans including the use of derivative products affect
systematic risks as discussed in Franke & Krahnen (2006).
Our results are related to the literature on banking regulation. Comprehensive sur-
veys with different emphases are given by Bhattacharya & Thakor (1993), Dewatripont
& Tirole (1994), Hellwig (1994), Freixas & Rochet (1997), or Bhattacharya, Boot &
Thakor (1998). Overall, we suggest that increased sophistication in rating2 as advo-
cated in the new banking regulatory framework (Basel II) may produce unintended
negative side effects. Indeed, the analysis of our paper indicates that increased sophis-
tication in banking may create more instability in the long run.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the model and both
types of banking systems. In Section 3 we examine simple banks, and in Section 4 we
perform the mirror-image of the analysis for sophisticated banks. In Section 5 both
systems are compared and our main results are presented. Section 6 concludes.
2Krahnen & Weber (2001) develop a comprehensive set of intuitive rating principles.
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2 Model
2.1 Households and entrepreneurs
We consider a two-period model with periods t = 1 and t = 2. The population of
agents consists of a continuum indexed by [0, 1]. Each agent has individual wealth W
in the first period. Agents are divided into two classes. One fraction of agents, indexed
by [0, η] (0 < η < 1), are potential entrepreneurs. The other fraction, indexed by (η, 1],
are consumers. Potential entrepreneurs and consumers differ in that only the former
have access to investment technologies.
Consumers are endowed with consumption preferences in the two periods of their lives,
with c1, c2 respectively denoting youthful and elderly consumption in money terms. For
simplification, let u(c1, c2) = ln (c1) + δ ln (c2) be the intertemporal utility function of
a consumer, where δ (0 < δ < 1) is the discount factor. Accordingly, a young consumer
inelastically saves the amount s = δ
1+δ
W if he can transfer wealth from one period to
the next at a certain interest rate. We denote the aggregate savings of consumers by
S = (1− η)s.
Potential entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and to consume only in the
second period. Each entrepreneur has to decide whether to invest in a production
project that converts period-1 goods into period-2 goods, to provide equity for banks,
or to invest her funds in an alternative project with return rE (rE > 0). The alternative
investment opportunity may be thought of as an outside option, such as government
bonds or investments in other sectors of the economy that are not modeled explicitly.3
The funds required for each production project are fixed at W + I, so that an en-
trepreneur must borrow I additional units of the good from banks to undertake the
production project. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in the quality of their production
projects which depends on their index i. The quality parameter of entrepreneur i is
assumed to be private information. If an entrepreneur of type i obtains additional
resources I and decides to invest, investment returns in the second period amount to
y = q(1 + i)f(W + I),
where f denotes a standard atemporal neoclassical production function and q ∈ R+
represents an exogenous macroeconomic productivity shock in the economy. Since W
3For simplicity we assume that consumers are not allowed to invest in the alternative project. This
can be justified by liquidity services of deposits. However, the results carry over to the case in which
consumers hold a portfolio of deposits and other assets. In this case, the saving function is of the form
S = S(rd, rE) where r
d is the deposit rate.
4
and I will remain fixed throughout the paper, we write f = f(W +I). The distribution
of shocks q is assumed to be given by a continuous density function h(q) with support
on a compact interval [q, q] with 0 < q < q.
Entrepreneurs are price-takers and operate under limited liability. Given a loan interest
rate rc, the expected profit of an investing entrepreneur i is
Π(i, rc) :=
∫ q
q
max{q(1 + i)f − I(1 + rc), 0} h(q)dq. (1)
Note that Π(i, rc) is monotonically increasing in quality levels i and monotonically
decreasing in loan rates rc. A risk-neutral entrepreneur with the quality parameter
i ∈ [0, η] will prefer to invest in the production project rather than into the alternative
investment project if the return on the production project is expected to be larger than
the return on the alternative project, i.e., if
Π(i, rc) ≥ W (1 + rE).
We assume that savings are never sufficient to fund all entrepreneurs. Since the interest-
rate elasticity of savings is zero, this condition takes the form
S := (1− η) s < η I. (2)
2.2 Banking sector
Following Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2004), we assume that depositors cannot ob-
serve the quality parameters of entrepreneurs and cannot verify whether or not an
entrepreneur invests. The existence of such market frictions necessitates financial inter-
mediation (see e.g. Hellwig 1994). To alleviate there information problems, we assume
that there are n (commercial) banks, indexed by j = 1, . . . , n (n > 1), which are owned
by entrepreneurs so that banks are risk-neutral. Banks finance production projects and
maximize profits accruing to shareholders. They monitor loans as delegated monitors
in the sense of Diamond (1984) and their monitoring is assumed to be efficient in the
sense that they are able to secure both the investment of an entrepreneur and the
liquidation value in case of default, cf. Gersbach & Uhlig (2005).
To avoid that properties other than the ability to rate entrepreneurs determine the re-
sults, we make the same assumption regarding the competitive structure of the banking
sector. First, both banking systems compete for equity and loans while facing a given
deposit interest rate rd. Each bank j can offer deposit contracts D(rd), where 1 + rd
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is the repayment offered for one unit of money. Second, banks raise equity by issuing
equity contracts. An equity contract specifies that the holder is entitled to obtain a
share of dividends in proportion to the resources he has given to a particular bank.
By providing equity, entrepreneurs become owners of a bank. A bank becomes a le-
gal entity and can only operate if it obtains a positive amount of equity.4 Third, both
banking systems are perfectly competitive. Bank owners have the opportunity to invest
in the alternative project with return 1 + rE (rE > 0).
Competition among banks determines the level of equity and loan interest rates. We
distinguish between a simple and a sophisticated banking system which differ only in
their ability to rate the quality of an entrepreneur’s production project.
1. Simple Banking System. The essential feature of the simple banking system
is that banks are unable to rate entrepreneurs individually and to adjust loan
contracts to the quality parameter i of an entrepreneur. Banks only have an
average rating of entrepreneurs and offer all entrepreneurs the same loan contract
C(rc), where 1 + rc is the repayment required from entrepreneurs for one unit of
borrowed money.
2. Sophisticated Banking System. In a sophisticated banking system, banks are
able to rate each entrepreneur individually and to offer entrepreneur-specific loan
contracts, denoted by C(rci ), where r
c
i is the loan interest rate demanded from an
entrepreneur of type i.
In both banking systems, banks operate under unlimited liability and loans are only
constrained by the amount of equity and deposits. We assume throughout that aggre-
gate uncertainty is canceled out when depositors and entrepreneurs randomly choose
banks.5 As all banks are identical, they will obtain the same amount of equity and
deposits in a particular banking system.
With these assumptions, the financial intermediation process in either system is as
follows. Given rd, banks in the first period offer equity contracts and loan contracts rc
(simple banking) or loan contracts {rci}
η
i=0 (sophisticated banking), respectively. Each
bank j obtains an amount of dj in equity and an equal share of deposits from consumers.
4Otherwise the legal entity is not founded as there are no owners. As banks take all equity capital
they can obtain, the equilibrium value will be determined by the supply of equity.
5The exact construction of individual randomness so that this statement holds can be found in
Alo´s-Ferrer (1999). We could also rely on the weaker forms of the strong law of large numbers
developed in Al-Najjar (1995) and Uhlig (1996), where independence of individual random variables
can be assumed and aggregate stability is the limit of an economy with finite characteristics.
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Entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Money is exchanged. In the second
period, funded entrepreneurs produce subject to a macroeconomic shock and pay back
loans with limited liability. Banks repay depositors and equity holders.
Some remarks regarding the relationship between rd and rE are in order. We assume
rd ≤ rE and hence entrepreneurs have no incentive to bring their wealth to banks as
deposits. Recall that we assumed that households can only provide deposits. If, on the
contrary, households could invest their funds at no costs in the alternative project, we
would have to assume rd = rE. This is a special case of our model.
We are now ready to investigate to what extent the ability of a competitive banking
system to rate firms reduces its vulnerability to firm bankruptcies. To this end, we will
compare how equity develops in both types of banking systems. We are particularly
interested in the distribution and downside risk of equity in the second period. It is
intuitively clear that the lower accumulated equity is in period 2, the more the stability
of the banking sector is endangered.
3 Competitive Equilibria for Simple Banks
We develop the equilibrium concept for a simple banking system in which banks are
unable to rate entrepreneurs individually. Recall that each entrepreneur owns W units
of funds that she can invest either into a production project, into equity of the banking
system or into the alternative project. If the total investment of entrepreneurs into the
banking system is d, the amount of equity of an individual bank is d
n
. As all banks are
assumed to be identical, the equilibrium conditions will be formulated for the whole
banking system.
We will assume throughout that the amount of equity which economic agents are able
to supply at expected gross returns 1+ rE suffices to balance loan demand and supply.
Let i∗ ∈ [0, η] be the critical quality level of an entrepreneur such that all entrepreneurs
i ∈ [i∗, η] invest in their own production project and all entrepreneurs i ∈ [0, i∗) either
provide bank equity or invest in the alternative project. Since each entrepreneur is
endowed with W units of funds, the available total funds S+i∗W required for financing
the entrepreneurs must be larger than the credit volume [η − i∗]I, that is,
S + i∗W ≥ [η − i∗]I. (3)
Given the condition on available deposits (2), condition (3) holds for all large enough
7
critical quality levels
i∗ ≥ i :=
ηI − S
I + W
. (4)
In other words, at least i entrepreneurs must provide their endowments for equity in
order to meet (3). Given i∗ ≥ i, banks’ equity d∗ must satisfy
S + d∗ = [η − i∗]I. (5)
In a competitive equilibrium, (5) states that loan supply must equal loan demand. The
remaining resources i∗W − d∗ may then be invested into the alternative project.
3.1 Equilibrium concept
Let rd ≥ 0 be the deposit interest rate of the banking system which is the same for all
banks. Banks receive funds S from consumers that have to be paid back with interest
at the end of the second period. In a simple banking system, banks lend
[
η − i∗
]
I to
firms and charge the same loan interest rate rc to all investing entrepreneurs. Given the
loan interest rate rc and some critical quality level i∗, banks’ payments P = P
(
q, i∗, r
c
)
at the end of the second period are
P
(
q, i∗, r
c
)
=
∫ η
i∗
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
(
1 + rc
)}
di. (6)
The equity level of the banking system in the second period is given by
G(q, i∗, r
c) = P
(
q, i∗, r
c
)
− S(1 + rd). (7)
We next define a competitive equilibrium for a simple banking system. Intuitively, a
competitive equilibrium is an equity level and a loan interest rate
(
d∗, r
c
∗
)
such that
(i) the equity market clears,
(ii) firms take optimal investment decisions,
(iii) the market for loans is balanced.
In order to formalize this concept, observe that given a critical quality level i∗ and a
loan interest rate rc, the expected profits of the banking system are
E [G(·, i∗, r
c)] = E
[
P
(
·, i∗, r
c
)]
− S(1 + rd) (8)
=
q∫
q
P
(
q, i∗, r
c
)
h(q)dq − S(1 + rd).
Formally, a competitive equilibrium for a simple banking system is defined as follows.
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Definition 1
Let rd ≤ rE be given. A competitive equilibrium (with positive investment in the
alternative project) of a simple banking system which operates under unlimited liability
is a triplet (i∗, d∗, r
c
∗
) such that
E [G(·, i∗, r
c
∗
)] = d∗ (1 + rE), (9)
Π (i∗, r
c
∗
) = W (1 + rE), (10)[
η − i∗
]
I = S + d∗, (11)
i∗ W > d∗. (12)
Equation (9) is the equilibrium condition in the equity market.6 If the return were
lower than rE, no equity would be supplied and hence no bank could operate. If the
expected return were higher, more equity would be supplied by entrepreneurs with
i ≤ i∗ and hence this cannot be an equilibrium either. The equilibrium condition
(9) forces a spread rc
∗
− r¯d that accounts for the risk of losses on loans and possible
differences in capital costs r¯d (deposits) and rE (equity). Note that for rE = r¯
d, the
spread rc
∗
− r¯d is the risk premium banks must obtain in order to generate the return
on equity 1 + rE. Equation (10) is the indifference condition for the critical quality
level i∗, which determines the demand for loans. Equation (11) is the equilibrium
condition for savings and investments at banks already given in (5), showing that the
critical entrepreneur i∗ is independent of the loan interest rate. The last condition (12)
ensures that there are enough entrepreneurs who invest into equity so that the banking
system has enough funds to finance production projects. Throughout this paper, we
focus on equilibria with positive investment in the alternative project as economically
these are the more plausible ones.
3.2 Existence of competitive equilibria
Since savings S are independent of deposit rates, the existence and uniqueness of a
competitive equilibrium is straightforward to establish.
Proposition 1
Let rE ≥ 0 be given and suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Π(i, 0) > W (1 + rE) > Π(i, rE).
6Alternatively, this equation may be interpreted as a free-entry and free-exit condition for banks,
cf. Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2006).
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(ii) The average repayments of the entrepreneur with the highest quality level η
satisfies
R(η, rcη) :=
∫ q
q
min
{
q(1 + η)f, I(1 + rcη)
}
h(q)dq > I(1 + rE),
where rcη ≥ 0 is given by Π(η, r
c
η) = W (1 + rE).
Then for rd ≤ rE sufficiently close to rE, a simple banking system admits a unique
competitive equilibrium (i∗, d∗, r
c
∗
), where i∗ = i∗(rE), r
c
∗
= rc
∗
(rE), and d∗ = d∗(rE).
Corollary 1
The loan interest rate satisfies rc
∗
= rc
∗
(rE) > rE for rE = r
d.
The proofs of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are given in Appendix A. Condition (i) in
Proposition 1 requires that entrepreneur i is willing to invest in her production project
for zero loan interest rates while she will invest into equity or into the alternative
project if the loan interest rate is higher than rE. The second condition (ii) states that
the average return of the highest quality entrepreneur η at the loan interest rate at
which she is indifferent between investing in the two projects is higher than the return
on I at the interest rate of the alternative project rE. Hence it is attractive for banks
to finance at least high-quality production projects.
3.3 Instability
We are now in a position to calculate the default probability of a simple banking system.
Writing
P∗(q, rE) := P
(
q, i∗(rE), r
c
∗
(rE)
)
for repayments in a competitive equilibrium, average repayments of entrepreneurs are
E
[
P∗(·, rE)
]
= d∗(1 + rE) + S(1 + r
d) (13)
and hence are positive. To obtain further insight into the nature of equilibrium interest
rates, consider aggregate losses of the banking system in equilibrium. Using (6), these
are formally defined as
L(q, rE) := [η − i∗(rE)]I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
− P∗(q, rE) (14)
=
∫ η
i∗(rE)
max
{
I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
− q(1 + i)f , 0
}
di.
10
Expected aggregate losses in equilibrium are
L(rE) := E
[
L(·, rE)
]
(15)
= [η − i∗(rE)]I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
− E
[
P∗(·, rE)
]
.
Inserting (13), (14), and (15) into (7), future bank capital of a simple banking system
in the second period is
G∗(q, rE) := G
(
q, i∗(rE), r
c
∗
(rE)
)
(16)
= P∗(q, rE)− E
[
P∗(·, rE)
]
+ d∗(1 + rE)
= L(rE)− L(q, rE) + d∗(1 + rE).
An entrepreneur with quality level i goes bankrupt if she is unable to fully pay back
her credit, that is, if
I
(
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
)
> q(1 + i)f.
The entrepreneur with the lowest quality level who is not bankrupt after encountering
the shock q is given by
iB = iB(q, rE) :=


I
(
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
)
qf
− 1 if qTB(rE) ≤ q < qNB(rE),
i∗(rE) if q ≥ qNB(rE),
(17)
where
qNB(rE) :=
I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
[
1 + i∗(rE)
]
f
and qTB(rE) :=
I
(
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
)
(1 + η)f
. (18)
If shocks are sufficiently positive q ≥ qNB(rE), then no firm goes bankrupt and ag-
gregate losses of banks are zero. For shocks qTB(rE) ≤ q < qNB(rE), all investing
entrepreneurs with quality levels i∗ < i < iB(q, rE) enter bankruptcy, whereas en-
trepreneurs with quality levels i ≥ iB(q, rE) pay back their loans fully. On the other
hand, all entrepreneurs will enter bankruptcy if q < qTB(rE) and losses are maximal.
It follows directly from (16) that the future bank capital is on average positive, so that
a simple banking system will not default on average. The probability of a system-wide
default by banks can now be calculated as follows. An individual bank is bankrupt
if second period equity is negative. Due to the assumed symmetry of banks, this is
equivalent to the condition G∗(q, rE) < 0 stating that the whole banking system is
bankrupt. Using (16), this condition takes the form
d∗(1 + rE) < L(q, rE)− L(rE). (19)
By (17) a necessary condition for the default of a bank is q < qNB(rE). The default
probability for banks can now be determined as follows.
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Proposition 2
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 1, assume that
d∗(1 + rE) < L(q, rE)− L(rE),
so that banks may default. Then there exists a unique critical level q < qcrit < qNB(rE)
for macroeconomic shocks, such that the banking system defaults if and only if q < qcrit.
The default probability is
Πdefault := Prob
(
d∗(1 + rE) < L(q, rE)− L(rE)
)
=
∫ qcrit
q
h(q)dq. (20)
Proposition 2, the proof of which is given in Appendix A, shows that banks default with
positive probability as soon as the buffer d∗(1 + rE) is too small to insure against neg-
ative macroeconomic shocks. If the macroeconomic shocks are uniformly distributed,
the default probability takes the following explicit form.
Corollary 2
If the shocks are uniformly distributed, the default probability is
Πdefault =
qcrit − q
q − q
.
Observe that qcrit depends on rE. The preceding results allows us to characterize
the default probability of the banking system in terms of the underlying exogenous
parameters and distributions. The equation (20) is a value-at-risk formula for the
banking system and for an individual bank. Suppose that Πdefault is predetermined by
banking regulation. Equation (20) determines then the required level for bank capital
d∗ such that the default risk is equal to Πdefault.
In the next section we carry out the same exercise for a sophisticated banking system.
4 Competitive Equilibria for Sophisticated Banks
4.1 Equilibrium concept
We turn to the other polar case in which banks are sophisticated in their rating abilities
so that they are able to detect the quality level i of an individual entrepreneur. They
can thus determine the firm-specific default probability. The key idea of the equilibrium
concept for sophisticated banks is to require that banks charge a fair risk premium for
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each loan in the sense that the average return on each loan is equal to the risk-free
return on equity. Let
R(i, rci ) =
q∫
q
min {q(1 + i)f, I(1 + rci )} h(q)dq
denote the expected repayment from an entrepreneur with quality level i who has
received a loan size I at the interest rate rci . In requiring banks to earn the same return
on each investing entrepreneur, an individualized interest rate rci for entrepreneur i has
to be such that
R
(
i, rci
) !
= R
(
io, rcio
)
for all investing entrepreneurs i ∈ [io, η]. Let di and Si denote the amount of equity
and deposits used to finance the loan of quality I. We assume that the debt/equity
ratio is the same across loans7. Hence, we have
di =
d
η − io
and Si =
S
η − io
.
As all banks must pay a fixed deposit interest rate rd on deposits Si, the individual
return of an investing entrepreneur i must be at least
R
(
i, rci
)
≥
1
[η − io]
[
d(1 + rE) + S(1 + r
d)
]
so that entrepreneurs with low-quality projects are willing to supply equity.
Intuitively, a competitive equilibrium for a sophisticated banking system is a list con-
sisting of a critical entrepreneur, an equity level, and loan interest rates
{
io
∗
, do
∗
,
{
rco
∗
(i)
}η
i=io
∗
}
such that
(i) the equity market clears,
(ii) firms take optimal investment decisions,
(iii) the market for loans is balanced.
More formally, a competitive equilibrium with financial intermediation for a sophisti-
cated banking system is defined as follows:
7This corresponds to the capital requirements in the first Basel Accord.
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Definition 2
Let rd ≤ rE be given. A sophisticated (competitive) equilibrium (with positive invest-
ment in the alternative project) of a sophisticated banking system is a list{
io
∗
, do
∗
,
{
rco
∗
(i)
}η
i=io
∗
}
consisting of a critical entrepreneur i∗, an equity level d
o
∗
and loan interest rates rco
∗
(i),
i ∈ [io
∗
, η], such that
[η − io
∗
]R
(
i, rco
∗
(i)
)
= do
∗
(1 + rE) + S(1 + r
d), i ∈ [io
∗
, η], (21)
Π
(
io
∗
, rco
∗
(io
∗
)
)
= W (1 + rE), (22)
[
η − io
∗
]
I = S + do
∗
, (23)
io
∗
W > do
∗
. (24)
Condition (21) states that on average banks must earn the same return on each loan.
In particular, on average banks must earn 1+ rE on equity on each individual loan. In
the next section we will show in more detail that (21) is equivalent to market clearing
in the equity market. Condition (22) is the indifference condition for entrepreneurs,
recalling that Π(i, rc) is increasing in quality levels i. As before, (23) is the equilibrium
condition for savings and investments at banks determining the critical entrepreneur
io
∗
, whereas Condition (24) guarantees that the required equity for banks is available.
4.2 Existence of sophisticated equilibria
The existence of sophisticated equilibria can be established as follows. Recall for this
purpose that according to (4) at least i entrepreneurs are required to provide banks
with equity.
Proposition 3
Let rE ≥ 0 be arbitrary and suppose that the following holds:
(i) Π(i, 0) > W (1 + rE) > Π(i, rE),
(ii) R(i, rco) > R(η, 0) for r
c
0 which satisfies Π(i, r
c
o) = W (1 + rE).
Then for rd ≤ rE sufficiently close to rE, a sophisticated banking system admits a
unique sophisticated equilibrium{
io
∗
, do
∗
,
{
rco
∗
(i)
}η
i=io
∗
}
,
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where io
∗
= io
∗
(rE), r
co
∗
(i) = rco
∗
(i, rE) and d
o
∗
= do
∗
(rE).
Corollary 3
Loan interest rates rco
∗
(i, rE), i ∈ [i
o
∗
, η] are non-increasing in quality levels. If there
exists an entrepreneur iNB ∈ [i
o
∗
, η] such that
q(1 + iNB)f ≥ I
[
1 + rco
∗
(iNB, rE)
]
,
so that all entrepreneurs i ≥ iNB meet their obligations, then loan interest rates are
given by
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE) =
R
(
io
∗
, rco
∗
(io
∗
, rE)
)
I
, for all i ∈ [iNB, η].
The proofs of Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 are given in Appendix A. Condition (i) in
Proposition 3 requires that entrepreneur i is willing to invest in her production project
for zero loan interest rates but will either invest into equity or the alternative project
for loan interest rates above rE. Condition (ii) guarantees that the banking system
is capable of tailoring loan interest rates according to the quality of the production
project so that risk premia are fair and entrepreneurs are still willing to invest.
Corollary 3 shows that a sophisticated banking system provides a floor
R
(
io
∗
,rco
∗
(io
∗
,rE)
)
I
for the loan-interest rates. All entrepreneurs who meet their obligations with certainty
will pay the same interest rate which is given by the floor. All other entrepreneurs pay a
higher loan-interest rate. For these entrepreneurs the loan-interest rate is monotonically
decreasing with the quality of their production projects.
We show in detail that the equilibrium condition (21) is equivalent to market clearing
in the equity market. According to the definition of a sophisticated equilibrium, it
follows from (21) that equilibrium loan interest rates must satisfy
R
(
i, rco
∗
(i, rE)
)
= R
(
io
∗
, rco
∗
(io
∗
, rE)
)
, i ∈ [io
∗
, η]. (25)
The repayments to banks in a sophisticated banking system are
P o
∗
(q, rE) =
∫ η
io
∗
(rE)
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE)
]}
di. (26)
Taking expectations and using (25), the expected repayments in a sophisticated equi-
librium are
E
[
P o
∗
(·, rE)
]
=
[
η − io
∗
]
R
(
io
∗
, rco
∗
(io
∗
, rE)
)
= do
∗
(1 + rE) + S[1 + r
d]. (27)
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In view of (21), the future bank capital of the sophisticated system in equilibrium is
Go
∗
(q, rE) := P
o
∗
(q, rE) − S[1 + r
d]
= P o
∗
(q, rE)− E
[
P o
∗
(·, rE)
]
+ do
∗
(1 + rE). (28)
Thus
E [Go
∗
(·, rE)] = d
o
∗
(1 + rE)
which is the equilibrium condition in the equity market.
4.3 Instability
Similar to the case of simple banking, we can derive the default probability of an
individual bank, which is equal to the probability of a system-wide collapse of the
banking system. Aggregate losses of the sophisticated system are formally defined by
Lo(q, rE) =
∫ η
io
∗
(rE)
I
[
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE)
]
di − P o
∗
(q, rE). (29)
Using (25), expected aggregate losses are
Lo(rE) := E
[
Lo(·, rE)
]
=
∫ η
io
∗
(rE)
I
[
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE)
]
di − E
[
P o
∗
(·, rE)
]
. (30)
Inserting (29) and (30) into (28) yields
Go
∗
(q, rE) = L
o(rE)− L
o(q, rE) + d
o
∗
(1 + rE). (31)
The default condition for an individual bank and for the banking system is Go
∗
(q, rE) <
0 which, using (31), takes the form
do
∗
(1 + rE) < L
o(q, rE)− L
o(rE). (32)
It can readily be seen from (31) that the future equity of the banking system is positive
for sufficiently high shocks q.
It follows from (29) that Lo(q, rE) is decreasing in q. Therefore, the following proposi-
tion is proven analogously to Proposition 2.
Proposition 4
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3, assume that
do
∗
(1 + rE) < L
o(q, rE)− L
o(rE),
16
so that banks may default. Then there exists a unique critical level q < qocrit ≤ qNB(rE)
for macroeconomic shocks, such that a sophisticated banking system defaults if, and
only if, q < qocrit. The default probability is
Πodefault := Prob
(
do
∗
(1 + rE) < L
o(q, rE)− L
o(rE)
)
=
∫ qo
crit
q
h(q)dq. (33)
Corollary 4
If, in addition, the shocks are uniformly distributed, the default probability is then
Πodefault =
qocrit − q
q − q
.
Similar to the case of a simple banking system, (33) is a value-at-risk formula for a
sophisticated banking system. Proposition 4 states that banks default with positive
probability as soon as the buffer do
∗
(1 + rE) is too small to insure against negative
macroeconomic shocks. If losses exceed average losses, this case will occur for a banking
system whose capital base is too small.
5 Comparison of the two Systems
For a comparison of the two banking systems, let us first consider the special case in
which no firm bankruptcies occur in the simple banking system. This will occur if
q(1 + i∗)f ≥ I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
,
where i∗ = i∗(rE). The expected repayment of banks from entrepreneurs are then
R
(
i, rc
∗
(rE)
)
= I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
for all i ∈ [i∗, η]
and by virtue of Proposition 3 we have
io
∗
= i∗ and r
co
∗
(i, rE) = r
c
∗
(rE) for all i ∈ [i∗, η],
implying that the simple and the sophisticated banking system charge the same loan-
interest rates and finance the same number of entrepreneurs.
This situation changes as soon as firm bankruptcies are possible. In the next theorem
we compare the loan interest rate in the simple banking system with the schedule of
loan interest rates in a sophisticated banking system.
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Theorem 1
Let the hypotheses of Propositions 1 and 3 be satisfied and assume that firm bankrupt-
cies occur with positive probability. Then there exists iER ∈ [i
o
∗
, η) with
(i) rc
∗
(rE) < r
co
∗
(i, rE), i ∈ [i
o
∗
, iER),
(ii) rc
∗
(rE) = r
co
∗
(iER, rE),
(iii) rc
∗
(rE) > r
co
∗
(i, rE), i ∈ (iER, η].
The proof of Theorem 1 are given in the appendix. Theorem 1 shows that loan interest
rates for high-quality borrowers fall below the loan interest rate that is obtained in
a simple banking system. This is a result of competition which enforces the same
return on equity in both systems. Sophisticated banks change higher interest rates
to intermediate quality borrowers in order to compensate for higher default risk and
reward high-quality borrowers by low loan interest rates. An immediate consequence
of Theorem 1 is that sophisticated banks expect higher repayments from low-quality
entrepreneurs than simple banks. In this sense sophisticated banks eliminate cross-
subsidization between their borrowers.
The ability of the two systems to attract equity is compared next.
Theorem 2
Let hypotheses of Propositions 1 and 3 be satisfied and assume that bankruptcies occur
with positive probability. Then the following properties hold:
(i) i∗(rE) < i
o
∗
(rE), (ii) d∗(rE) > d
o
∗
(rE),
(iii)
[
i∗(rE)W − d∗(rE)
]
<
[
io
∗
(rE)W − d
o
∗
(rE)
]
.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the appendix. The intuition for Theorem 2 may
be described as follows. In order to adjust loan interest rates to the quality level of
entrepreneurs and to generate equity returns of 1 + rE at the same time, sophisticated
banks charge lower quality entrepreneurs higher loan interest rates, making it less
attractive for them to invest into their production projects. Hence, simple banks invite
more entrepreneurs to invest into their production projects than sophisticated banks,
i.e., i∗ < i
o
∗
. Market clearing in the loan and equity market enables a simple banking
system to attract the necessary equity so that more production projects are financed,
i.e., η − io
∗
< η − i∗. As a consequence, in a sophisticated banking system more
resources are invested in the alternative project, while at the same time high-quality
entrepreneurs pay lower loan interest rates.
We next address the question of which of the two banking systems will accumulate
more second-period equity. From the market clearing conditions
E
[
G∗(·, rE)
]
= d∗(1 + rE) and E
[
Go
∗
(·, rE)
]
= do
∗
(1 + rE),
we infer from Theorem 2 that expected future equity of the simple banking system is
higher than in the sophisticated system. Using (13) and (27), we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 5
Under the hypotheses of Propositions 1 and 3, expected repayment of the simple bank-
ing system is higher than expected repayment of the sophisticated system, that is,
E
[
P∗(·, rE)
]
− E
[
P o
∗
(·, rE)
]
= [d∗ − d
o
∗
](1 + rE) > 0. (34)
To further illustrate the consequences of Theorem 2, consider a worst-case scenario in
which in both systems all entrepreneurs enter bankruptcy, such that banks in both
systems will receive only the respective liquidation values. For such a shock denoted
by qlow, we have
P∗(qlow, rE) = qlowf [η − i∗]
[
1 +
η + i∗
2
]
= qlowf
[
[η − i∗] +
1
2
[η2 − i2
∗
]
]
for the simple banking system and
P o
∗
(qlow, rE) = qlowf [η − i
o
∗
]
[
1 +
η + io
∗
2
]
= qlowf
[
[η − io
∗
] + 1
2
[η2 − io2
∗
]
]
for the sophisticated banking system. Since by Theorem 2 (i), i∗ < i
o
∗
, we have
P∗(qlow, rE) > P
o
∗
(qlow, rE),
so that in a worst-case scenario the simple banking system receives higher repayments
than the sophisticated banking system. This argument carries over to the case with
adverse shocks in which not necessarily all entrepreneurs enter bankruptcy. We have
P∗(q, rE)− P
o
∗
(q, rE) =
∫ io
∗
(rE)
i∗(rE)
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]}
di (35)
+
∫ η
io
∗
(rE)
g(i, q)di,
where
g(i, q) := min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]}
−min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE)
]}
.
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The first term on the r.h.s. of (35) is a positive volume effect and reflects the fact that
the simple system finances more production projects. Using Theorem 1, there exists a
quality level iER and a critical shock qER > q such that
qER(1 + iER)f = I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
= I
[
1 + rco
∗
(iER, rE)
]
.
For the shock qER entrepreneurs with quality levels i ≥ iER fully meet their repayment
obligations in both systems, implying that g(i, qER) ≥ 0 for i ≥ iER. On the other
hand, all entrepreneurs i < iER default at the shock qER, so that g(i, qER) = 0 for
i < iER. This implies that for all shocks q ≤ qER,
G∗(q, rE)−G
o
∗
(q, rE) = P∗(q, rE)− P
o
∗
(q, rE) > 0.
Hence the simple banking system outperforms the sophisticated system for adverse
shocks. This result is illustrated in Figure 1. It is summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 6
Let the hypotheses of Propositions 1 and 3 be satisfied. Then there exists a criti-
cal shock qBE = qBE(rE) ≥ qER, so that the simple banking system outperforms the
sophisticated system for all shocks q < qBE. More precisely,
G∗(q, rE) > G
o
∗
(q, rE) for all q < qBE.
We conclude this section by comparing the default probabilities of the two banking
systems. Observe that the critical value qBE given in Proposition 6 depends signifi-
cantly on the quality level iER which in turn is determined by the distribution of the
macroeconomic shocks. The lower iER is, that is, the more entrepreneurs pay lower
loan interest rates in the sophisticated system, the higher qBE is. A priori, it cannot
be ruled out that qBE ≥ q. In this case the simple banking system outperforms the
sophisticated system for all shocks and its default probability Πdefault is lower than the
default probability of the sophisticated system Πodefault.
Matters are different if qBE < q and repayments in the sophisticated system are higher
for sufficiently high shocks, i.e., P o
∗
(q, rE) > P∗(q, rE) for q > qBE. A sufficient condition
for the case where no firm bankruptcies occur in both systems is∫ η
io
∗
I
[
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE)
]
di >
[
η − i∗] I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]
.
Our last theorem states conditions under which the default probability of a simple
banking system is lower than the default probability of the sophisticated system.
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Figure 1: Repayments of entrepreneurs.
Theorem 3
Let the hypotheses of Propositions 1 and 3 be satisfied and assume that the probability
density h of the macroeconomic shocks is strictly positive. Let qBE = qBE(rE) be given
by Proposition 6. Suppose that the productivity of entrepreneurs is high enough, i.e.,
P o
∗
(qBE, rE) > S(1 + r
d)
so that the sophisticated system will not default in response to shocks q ≥ qBE. Then
the default probability of the simple banking system is lower than the default proba-
bility of the sophisticated banking system, i.e.,
Πdefault < Π
o
default.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that sophistication in risk management benefits production projects of
high-quality entrepreneurs by lowering loan rates at the expense of production projects
of lower quality entrepreneurs. Sophisticated banks reduce the credit access of en-
trepreneurs with intermediate quality levels and attract less equity than simple banks.
As a consequence, expected repayments of the simple system are always higher and
its default risk is lower for sufficiently low deposit rates. These results suggests that
more sophistication in the assessment of individual entrepreneurs’ default risk may de-
crease banking stability if entrepreneurs’ productivity is sufficiently high. This may be
a serious concern for the impact of banking regulation.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. Set
rc :=
q(1 + η)f
I
− 1,
with q denoting the highest possible shock. Then profits of entrepreneur i are on
average zero, i.e., Π(i, rc) = 0 for rc ≥ rc with Π given in (1). Condition (10) takes the
form
Π
(
i, rc
)
−W (1 + rE)
!
= 0, i ∈ [i, η]. (36)
Since for all i ∈ [i, η] and each rE ≥ r
d sufficiently close to rd,
Π(i, 0) ≥ Π
(
i, 0
)
> W (1 + rE) > Π(i, r
c) = 0,
for each i ∈ [i, η], equation (36) has a solution rc = ϕ(i) such that
Π
(
i, ϕ(i)
)
−W (1 + rE) = 0 for all i ∈ [i, η]. (37)
Since Π(i, rc) is strictly increasing in i, this solution is uniquely determined. Since
Π(i, rc) is decreasing in rc ∈ [0, rc], ϕ is increasing in i.
Step 2. Consider the function F : [i, η] → R, defined by
F (i) :=
E
[
P
(
·, i, ϕ(i)
)]
[η − i]I
+
S(rE − r
d)
[η − i]I
− (1 + rE). (38)
Using (8) and (11), condition (9) takes the form
F (i∗) =
E
[
P
(
·, i∗, r
c
∗
)]
[η − i∗]I
+
S(rE − r
d)
[η − i∗]I
− (1 + rE)
!
= 0. (39)
By Assumption (i), W (1 + rE) > Π(i, rE) so that ϕ(i) < rE. Hence,
E
[
P
(
·, i, ϕ(i)
)]
− [η − i]I(1 + rE) + S(rE − r
d) (40)
≤ [η − i]I
[
ϕ(i)− rE
]
+ S(rE − r
d).
< 0
as long as rE is sufficiently close to r
d. This implies F (i) < 0. On the other hand, it
follows from
[η − i]R(i, rc) ≤ E
[
P
(
·, i, rc
)]
, i ∈ [i, η)
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that F (i) > 0 for sufficiently large i because
F (i) ≥
1
I
R
(
i, ϕ(i)
)
+
S(rE − r
d)
[η − i]I
− (1 + rE) > 0, (41)
noticing that rcη = ϕ(η) as defined in Assumption (ii). We infer from Step 1, that F (i)
is increasing in i. It then follows from (40) and (41) that for each rE sufficiently close
to rd there exists a unique i∗ = i∗(rE) so that F (i∗) = 0. Clearly, r
c
∗
= ϕ(i∗) and since
by construction i∗ > i, Condition (11) is satisfied. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1.
It follows from (39) that
0 = F (i∗) < 1 + r
c
∗
(rE) +
S(rE − r
d)
[η − i∗]I
− (1 + rE).
This proves the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 2.
By assumption, we have G∗(q, rE) < 0. Since G∗(q, rE) > 0 for q ≥ qNB(rE) and the
function G∗ is strictly increasing in q, there exists a unique critical shock q < qcrit <
qNB(rE) so that G∗(qcrit, rE) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Step 1. Analogous to the first step in the proof of Proposition 1, we can establish the
existence of a function ϕ : [i, η] → R with rc = ϕ(i) such that
Π
(
i, ϕ(i)
)
−W (1 + rE) = 0 for all i ∈ [i, η],
provided that rE ≥ r
d is sufficiently close to rd. Since Π(i, rc) is strictly increasing in
i, this solution is uniquely determined. Since Π(i, rc) is decreasing in rc ∈ [0, rc], ϕ is
increasing in i.
Step 2. Consider the function H : [i, η] → R, defined by
H(i) :=
1
I
R
(
i, ϕ(i)
)
+
S(rE − r
d)
[η − i]I
− (1 + rE). (42)
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Inserting (23), Condition (21) for io
∗
then takes the form
H(io
∗
) =
1
I
R
(
io
∗
, ϕ(io
∗
)
)
+
S(rE − r
d)
[η − io
∗
]I
− (1 + rE)
!
= 0.
Since
[η − i]R(i, rc) < E
[
P
(
·, i, rc
)]
, i ∈ [i, η),
we have H(i) < F (i) for all i ∈ [i, η), where the function F has been defined in (38).
Hence based on (40), H(i) < 0, provided that rE is sufficiently close to r
d. On the
other hand, clearly
R
(
η, ϕ(η)
)
+ S(rE − r
d) > 0, (43)
such that H(i) > 0 for sufficiently large i. Since ϕ(i) is increasing in i and R(i, rc) is
increasing in both arguments, H(i) is increasing in i. It now follows from (43) that for
each rE sufficiently close to r
d, there exists a unique io
∗
= i∗(rE) such that H(i
o
∗
) = 0.
Since by construction io
∗
> i, Condition (24) is satisfied.
Step 3. By assumption R
(
i, ϕ(i)
)
> R(η, 0) and ϕ(i) = rco. It follows from the
monotonicity of R(i, rc) and ϕ(i) that
R
(
io
∗
, ϕ(io
∗
)
)
> R(η, 0).
Hence there exists a function rco
∗
(i, rE) which satisfies
R
(
i, rco
∗
(i, rE)
)
= R
(
io
∗
, ϕ(io
∗
)
)
, i ∈ [io
∗
, η].
Proof of Corollary 3.
The proof follows directly from the implicit function theorem and the fact that R(i, rc)
is non-decreasing in i and rc.
Proof of Theorem 1.
In the two proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 that rc
∗
= ϕ(i∗) and r
co
∗
(io
∗
, rE) = ϕ(i
o
∗
),
respectively, where ϕ was defined in (37). Moreover, it was shown that ϕ is monoton-
ically increasing. Since by Theorem 2 io
∗
(rE) > i∗(rE), we have r
co
∗
(i, rE) > r
c
∗
(rE) in a
neighborhood of i ≥ io
∗
(rE).
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Assume, on the contrary, that
rco
∗
(i, rE) > r
c
∗
(rE) for all i ∈ [i
o
∗
, η]. (44)
It follows from (13) that average repayments of entrepreneurs in a competitive equilib-
rium are
E
[
P∗(·, rE)
]
=
[
η − i∗(rE)
]
I(1 + rE)− S(rE − r
d) (45)
and similar for the sophisticated system
E
[
P o
∗
(·, rE)
]
=
[
η − io
∗
(rE)
]
I(1 + rE)− S(rE − r
d). (46)
Hence
E
[
P∗(·, rE)
]
− E
[
P o
∗
(·, rE)
]
=
[
io
∗
(rE)− i∗(rE)
]
I(1 + rE). (47)
It follows from (45) that
E
[
P∗
(
·, rE
)]
≤
[
η − i∗(rE)
]
I(1 + rE)
and because of the monotonicity of the integrand
∫ io
∗
(rE)
i∗(rE)
∫ q
q
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]}
h(q)dq di ≤
[
io
∗
(rE)− i∗(rE)
]
I(1 + rE). (48)
Setting
g(i, q) := min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rc
∗
(rE)
]}
−min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rco
∗
(i, rE)
]}
,
we have
E
[
P∗
(
·, rE
)]
− E
[
P o
∗
(
·, rE
)]
≤
[
io
∗
(rE)− i∗(rE)
]
I(1 + rE) (49)
+
∫ io
∗
(rE)
i∗(rE)
∫ q
q
g(i, q) h(q)dq di.
Equations (47) and (49) imply that
∫ io
∗
(rE)
i∗(rE)
∫ q
q
g(i, q) h(q)dq di ≥ 0. (50)
The initial hypothesis (44) implies that
g(i, q) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [io
∗
, η], q ∈ [q, q]
with the strict inequality holding for i sufficiently close to io
∗
. Then (50) implies that
there exist i0 and q0 such that
g(i0, q0) > 0.
25
The assertion then follows from the continuity of g and the monotonicity of rco
∗
(i, rE).
Proof of Theorem 2.
It follows from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 that the critical entrepreneurs i∗ and
io
∗
are given by the conditions
F (i∗) = 0 and H(i
o
∗
) = 0,
where F and H were defined in (38) and (42), respectively. Again, since
[η − i]R(i, rc) ≤ E
[
P
(
·, i, rc
)]
, i ∈ [i, η),
we have H(i) < F (i) for all i ∈ [i, η), such that i∗ < i
o
∗
. This proves the first claim.
The second claim follows directly from the balance equation, so that do
∗
< d∗. The
third claim is an immediate consequence of the first two assertions.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Since both systems face a positive default risk,
S(1 + rd) > P∗(q, rE) > P
o
∗
(q, rE).
On the other hand
P∗(qBE, rE) > P
o
∗
(qBE, rE) > S(1 + r
d).
Since P∗ and P
o
∗
are increasing in q, it follows from Propositions 5 and 6 that qcrit < q
o
crit,
where the critical values qcrit and q
o
crit are given by
P∗(qcrit, rE) = P
o
∗
(qocrit, rE) = S(1 + r
d).
Recalling the definitions of the default probabilities (20) and (33), this completes the
proof.
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